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Abstract 
The relation between cognition and emotion has been increasingly explored in literature but few studies have 
explored the relation between social emotions and cognitive performances. 
To this end, 60 undergraduate female students were assigned to a dual-task condition in order to test their 
working memory abilities. They were then randomly assigned to three different writing disclosure tasks: shame 
condition, guilt condition and neutral condition. They were finally assigned to a new dual-task condition in order 
to assess differences on cognitive performances between the emotional and the neutral conditions. Statistically 
significant differences of dual-task performances related to the shame, guilt and neutral writing conditions were 
found. Shame and guilt conditions were related to lower cognitive performances than neutral condition subjects. 
In particular, state shame was a significant predictor of impairment in working memory performances. 
Furthermore shame-prone individuals were found to perform lower in working memory tests than guilt-prone 
participants suggesting a greater interference of shame (as emotional experience and as personal predisposition on 
working memory than guilt- related condition. 
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1. Main text 
1. Introduction 
Shame and guilt are distinctive self-conscious emotions that are inextricably linked to the self in relationship 
with others (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). These emotions can be experienced intensely enough since earliest 
interpersonal experiences and they are characterized by feelings of distress arising in response to personal 
transgressions (Wolf, Cohen, Panter, Insko, 2009). Although they share some important similarities, crucial 
differences in the phenomenology of shame and guilt have been reported in terms of adjustment, pathology, and 
interpersonal relatedness (Woien, Ernst, Patock-Peckham, & Nagoshi, 2003). For instance, it’s possible to 
differentiate shame and guilt both in terms of emotional experiences and in terms of shame and guilt-proneness 
(Anolli & Pascucci, 2005; Wallbott & Scherer, 1995; Tangney, Wagner, Gramzow, 1992). 
As emotional experiences, researchers have observed that guilt is an action-focused emotion owing that it 
involves self-criticism for a specific action (Tangney, Stuewig & Mashek, 2007; de Hooge, Breugelmans, & 
Zeelenberg, 2008). Feelings of guilt remain focused on a specific behavior and, as a consequence, on the harm 
that it may cause to others. In guilt emotional experience, the self is not the central object of negative evaluation, 
but the focus is rather on what has been done or undone (Lewis, 1971). So, guilt seems not to affect one’s core 
identity so that the self remains basically intact. When experiencing guilt, a person may think, ‘‘I did a bad 
action’’ (Anolli et al., 2005). Guilt, as emotional experience, involves a sense of tension, remorse and regret. It 
motivates performing reparative actions, including apology, confession and pro-social actions. Therefore, guilt is 
an adaptive and constructive moral affect, since it promotes behaviors that benefit interpersonal relationships 
(Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzov, 1989).  
In contrast, shame as emotional experience is directly related about the self which is the immediate focus of 
the evaluation. Shame emotion is accompanied by a sense of worthlessness and powerlessness or of “being small” 
and it has been often considered as more painful and “destructive” than guilt. In fact, feelings of shame are more 
likely to motivate desire to hide or escape the shame-inducing situation, to sink into the floor and disappear 
(Tangney et al., 2002). 
A second and integrative view of shame and guilt related process is in term of proneness. The term is used here 
to describe a lasting affective predisposition. A guilt-prone person usually makes internal, specific and unstable 
attributions when transgression occur (Tagney et al., 2002). Guilt-prone individuals appear better able to 
empathize with others and to accept responsibility for negative interpersonal events. They are relatively less prone 
to anger than their shame-prone peer and they feel unable to repair, apologize or amend for they have done wrong 
(Bybee & Quiles, 1998). On the contrary, shame-prone people seem to be more inclined to make internal, global 
and stable attributions and to have a negative self-conception with a decreasing of depression regardless of the 
circumstances. Shame-prone individuals tend more likely to blame others (as well as themselves) for negative 
events. Furthermore, they are more prone to rumination and to unexpressed anger and less able to empathize with 
others in general (Tangney et al., 2002). 
Although a lot of researchers have explored the relation between emotions and other psychological correlates, 
such as working memory (Baddeley, Banse, Huang & Page, 2012; Brose, Schmiedek, Lovden, Lindenberger, 
2011; Schmeichel & Demaree, 2010; Van Dillen & Koole, 2007), to our knowledge, studies that have analyzed 
the relation between social emotions and working memory are still scarce. Schmeichel and colleagues (2008) 
underline a link between high working memory capacity and ability in self-regulation of negative emotions. On 
the other hand, Van Dillen and Koole (2007), underlined that loading working memory can promote distraction 
from negative moods as well. Some studies (Brose et al., 2012; Joormann, & Gotlib, 2008) indicated a prevalence 
of deficits in cognitive control due to increased elaboration of negative material and of ruminal thoughts. In 
particular, reduction in working memory performances is coupled with high levels of negative emotions (Brose et 
al., 2012). Furthermore, other studies have shown evidence that other intra-individual variables such as trait 
anxiety can reduce cognitive test performances (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos & Calvo 2007; Owens, Stevenson 
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Norgate & Hadwin, 2008). Therefore, actual research is needed in order to explore the relation between memory, 
social emotions and personal traits.  
 
1.1 The present study 
In this paper, we want to quantitatively examine whether and to what extent shame and guilt interfere with 
working memory performances. In particular, its aims are (1) to determine the relative contributions of shame and 
of guilt, as emotional experience, to increases in deterioration of working memory performances and (2) to 
determine whether guilt- and shame-proneness and trait anxiety interfere with working memory performances 
evaluated through a dual-task condition. It can be hypothesize that, even if shame and guilt remain both disruptive 
emotions, individuals experiencing shame will have large negative effect on working memory performances as a 
consequence of worthlessness and powerlessness feeling that are in turn linked with an unworthy self.  
 
2. Methods 
2.1 Sample 
62 undergraduate female students enrolled in different faculties (Economics, Law, Science Education, 
Psychology) of University of Milano – Bicocca volunteered to participate in this study. The mean age of 
participants was 21.22 years (SD = 2.5). Of the 62 students that completed the baseline 60 (97%) participants 
completed the whole experiment. The research had been conducted following the APA’s ethical principles and 
code of conduct (American Psychological Association, 2010). 
 
 
2.2 Procedure 
Procedure is composed of two steps: in the first one participants received one envelop in which they found 
informed consent, a form to gather demographic information and two questionnaires: the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI) (Spielberg, 2005) and the Test of Self-Conscious Affects (TOSCA) (Tangney et al., 1989). STAI 
allows the assessment of trait anxiety and it was used in order to evaluate anxiety trait contribution to working 
memory interferences. TOSCA allows the assessment of guilt and shame dispositions in such a way to assess 
individual differences in the degree to which people are prone to experience shame and guilt across a range of 
situations involving failures or transgression (Woien et al., 2003). The Italian version of TOSCA was used 
because it has already been referred to back-translation procedure (Anolli et al., 2005). 
In the second step participants were received in a soundproof room lab of University of Milan – Bicocca and 
they were assigned to a paper and pencil dual-task test (DT1) (Della Sala, Foley, Beschin, Allerhand & Logie, 
2010). Before commencing the digit recall task, digit span of each individual was assessed in order to remove 
individual working memory capacity differences from final results. Dual-task procedure consisted of performing 
digit recall and tacking task separately and then simultaneously, following the procedure reported by Della Sala 
and colleagues.  
Then, participants were randomly assigned to three different writing disclosure tasks: shame condition (S), 
guilt condition (G) and neutral condition (N) in order to elicit different emotional experiences. In the condition S, 
participants were asked to write about a personal negative experience in which they felt so bad about their selves 
that they wanted to deny, escape and hide from. In the condition G, participants were asked to write about a 
personal negative experience in which they felt so inadequate about one specific behavior they wanted to confess 
or try repair to their  action. In the last condition (N), participants were asked to write about neutral topic such as 
the furniture of the room they were in. Before the start of the writing task, the experimenter went out of the room 
in order not to interfere with the emotional experience. All three different conditions lasted 10 minutes and 
participants were asked to quit their own writing when the experimenter re-entered into the room. At that point, 
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participants were assigned to a new dual-task test (DT2) in order to evaluate potential differences in working 
memory performances. Finally participants were asked to fill in the Shame and Guilt State Scale (SGSS, 
Marschall, Sanftner, Tangney, 1994) in order to gather information on levels of shame or guilt elicited after 
performing the writing task.  
 
2.3 Data analysis 
Since we were interested in exploring the impact of the emotional experience of guilt and shame on working 
memory performances also controlled for trait axiety, a three-block hierarchical multiple regression with enter 
method was applied (see Pedhazur, 1997 for further information). The regression model was set with the Δ dual-
task (DT2-DT1) as dependent variable and state shame/guilt, guilt- and shame-proneness and trait anxiety as 
independent determinants. For the condition G, the variable state guilt was added at step 1. At step 2, the effect of 
both guilt- and shame-proneness was then evaluated. Finally, the last determinants (trait anxiety ) was added at 
step 3.For the condition S, the strategy was the same apart from state shame included  in step 1. For the N 
condition, a last regression was run with both guilt-proneness and shame-proneness included at step 1 and the 
anxiety trait at step 2. Regression assumptions (e.g., homoscedasticity, multivariate normality) were checked and 
found to be fulfilled for all variables. Finally, a p <.001 Mahalanobi’s distance criterion was used to identify and 
skip multivariate outliers. All regression models were evaluated through statistically significant variation of R2 
and Cohen’s (1988) effect size f2. 
 
3. Findings 
Significant differences between participants were found between the three writing conditions comparing dual-
task-retest with dual-task scores: the writing of social emotional past experiences determine lower dual-task retest 
scores. High Δ dual-task scores indicates lower dual-task retest scores compared to those obtained before the 
writing task. If compared through ANOVA, Δ dual task scores in S (m = 59.30, sd = 12.07) and G (m = 49.11, sd 
= 5.03) writing conditions are significantly lower (F2,43 = 10.72, p < .001) than in the condition N (m = 27.52, sd 
= 13.67) (Table1). Tukey’s post-hoc comparison confirmed that all group scores are statistically different. 
Table 1. Mean (m) and standard deviations (sd) of DT1, DT2 and Δ dual task in the three writing conditions 
                 G 
      m                 sd 
                    S 
          m                 sd 
           N 
m                 sd 
DT1    95.12           18.81 104.72          23.31 103.67          16.59 
DT2    86.66           15.85 95.68            16.12 114.69          18.75 
Δ Dual-task      49.11             5.03 59.30            12.07  27.53             13.67 
 
In table 2 are reported values of first-order correlations between Δ Dual-task and other determinants once 
controlled for age. In particular, baseline measure of shame-proneness shows moderate-strong correlations with 
trait anxiety (r = .54) and with worse working memory performances measured by the Δ dual- task (r = .38). 
Table 2. First-order correlations between variables 
 1 2 3 4 
Shame-proneness (1)     
Guilt-proneness (2) .38*    
Trait Anxiety (3)  .54** .12   
Δ Dual-task  (4) .38* -.20 .163  
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                                      *  p < .05;   ** p < .001 
 
The result confirms evidences from other studies (e.g. Tangney, Stuewig & Mashek, 2007) suggesting that 
shame-prone people are likely to experience higher levels of anxiety. In a similar fashion, the statistically 
significant correlation ( r = .38) between shame-proneness and Δ dual-task suggested a plausible association 
between shame-prone people and worse working memory performances after experiencing emotional discomfort. 
On the contrary, guilt-proneness doesn’t show statistically significant correlations between trait anxiety and Δ 
dual task. Regression analysis will provide a more in-depth portrait into the relation among variables under study. 
The first regression (G condition) was performed using the Δ dual-task as dependent variable and state guilt 
as independent variable at step 1, and guilt- and shame-proneness at step 2 and trait anxiety entered at step 3 
(Table 3). 
Table 3. Multiple regression analyses on state guilt (SGSS) 
Dependent variable Independent Variables  B t p 
1.Step 
Δ dual-task 
 
        Constant 
        State Guilt 
 
45.54 
.43 
 
7.73 
1.05 
 
<.001 
.299 
2. Step     
Δ dual-task 
 
 
 Constant 
 State Guilt 
 Guilt-proneness 
 Shame-proneness 
111.71 
.192 
-1.70 
.92 
3.31 
.524 
-2.81 
3.3 
<.005 
.603 
<.01 
<.005 
3. Step 
Δ dual-task 
 
  
Constant 
 Guilt 
 Guilt-proneness 
 Shame-proneness 
 Trait Anxiety 
 
120.21 
.25 
-1.75 
1.06 
-.23 
 
3.39 
.67 
-2.86 
3.22 
-.82 
 
<.005 
.510 
<.01 
<.005 
.418 
 
At step 1, State guilt wasn’t a statistically significant determinants of differences in the Δ dual-task (F 1,37 = 
1.11, p = ns). When guilt- and shame-proneness were entered at step 2, the model is statistically significant (F 3,35 
= 4.98, p = .006; R2 = .299) and it accounted for a 30 % of the variance (Cohen’s f2 = 0.42) of Δ dual-task . More 
specifically, shame-proneness (B = .92, t = 3.22, p = .002) and guilt-proneness (B = -1.7, t = -2.81, p < .01) were 
statistically significant determinants, however only shame-proneness seemed to negatively affect the working 
memory performance. From this point of view, the more the shame-proneness is present, the more serious the 
interference with working memory become. The addition of trait anxiety at step 3 made no further significant 
contribution  to the prediction of  Δ dual-task (ΔF 4,35 = -1.11, p = ns, ΔR² = .01) thus suggesting the exclusion of 
the variable from the regression equation. 
The regression for the S condition was performed between Δ dual-task as the dependent variable and state 
shame as independent variable entered at step 1, and guilt- and shame-proneness entered at step 2, and trait 
anxiety entered at step 3 (Table 4). In line with what it was expected, state shame level was a statistically 
significant predictor of dual-task retest impairment as it is (F 1,37 = 19.01, p < .001, R2 = .339). The addition of 
shame- and guilt- predisposition variables inserted at step 2 made a statistically significant contribution to the 
prediction of differences in dual-task test scores (F 3,35  = 10.32, p < .001, R2 = .469 ). The addition of trait anxiety 
inserted at step 3 made no significant contribution to the prediction of  Δ dual-task (ΔF 4,34 = -1.01, p = ns, ΔR² = 
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.05). In summary, result of regression suggest to adopt the model represented at step 2 in which shame-proneness 
was a significant predictor determining lower scores in DT2 (B = .64, t = 2.49, p = .018) whereas guilt-proneness 
predicted better working memory performances (B =  -1.33, t = -2.47, p = .018). However state shame confirmed 
its importance remaining the stronger determinant of Δ dual-task (B = 1.28, p = 002). It was worthwhile to 
remark that the R² values accounted for 52% of the variance, a quite high value in the social science (the Cohen’s 
effect size f2 for multiple regressions was .98). 
Table 4. Multiple regression analyses on state shame (SGSS) 
Dependent variable Independent Variables  B T p 
1.Step 
Δ dual-task 
 
        Constant 
        State shame 
 
29.20 
1.67 
 
5.38 
4.36 
 
<.001 
<.001 
2. Step     
Δ dual-task 
 
 
 Constant 
 State shame 
 Guilt-proneness 
 Shame-proneness 
86.94 
1.29 
-1.33 
.64 
2.89 
3.40 
-2.48 
2.49 
<.01 
<.005 
<.05 
<.05 
3. Step 
Δ dual-task 
 
  
Constant 
 State shame 
 Guilt-proneness 
 Shame-proneness 
 Trait Anxiety 
 
101.26 
1.49 
-1.38 
.885 
-.46 
 
3.38 
3.91 
-2.65 
3.17 
-.28 
 
<.005 
<.001 
<.05 
<.005 
.067 
 
The last regression in N condition was performed between Δ dual-task as the dependent variable, guilt- and 
shame-proneness entered at step 1, and trait anxiety entered at step 2. Guilt- and shame-proneness made 
significant contribution to the prediction of dual-task accounting for a 29 % of the explained variance (Cohen’s f2 
= 0.41). The addition of trait anxiety inserted at step 2 made no significant contribution to the prediction of  Δ 
dual-task (ΔF 1,35 = -2.39, p = ns, ΔR² = .01). In the final model shame-proneness was a significant predictor 
determining lower scores in dual task retest (B = 1.08, t = 3.3, p < .005) whereas guilt-proneness showed 
significant results but in an opposite direction (B =  -1.78, t = -2.94, p = .006). Results are similar to what has 
been found in all conditions thus suggesting a general effect of guilt-proneness and shame-proneness on 
explaining part of the differences in working memory performances. However, the evaluation of the models 
support the idea that when subjects were exposed to shame-related conditions or experiences their scores on 
working memory test are much more lower than individuals exposed to guilt or neutral condition.  
 
4. Conclusions 
The results of regressions and correlational analyses are quite unequivocal and support the directional 
hypothesis that individuals experiencing shame will have large negative effect on working memory 
performances. In G condition, state guilt wasn’t uniquely predictive for Δ dual-task retest scores. On the contrary, 
in S condition state shame showed a statistically significant contribution in accounting for dual task scores at 
both t step 1 and 2. The significant contribution of state shame to the regression suggests that the severity of 
shame as emotional experience predicts worse working memory performances. These can be due to the fact that 
reparation tendencies that typically follow guilt emotional experiences could have led to reparative behavior and 
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could have made the memory of the past situations not so painful anymore. On the contrary, the memory of past 
shame emotional experiences and the probable following lack of reparative behavior could have determined 
stronger interferences in working memory processes suggesting shame to be more impairment than guilt. Results 
in N condition resemble the pattern of relationship found between Δ dual-task, shame- and guilt-proneness in all 
group. 
In fact, shame-proneness predicted worse working memory performances after emotional elicitation after the 
writing of both guilt and shame past experiences in all regression analysis whereas the contributions of guilt-
proneness were statistically significant but limited in magnitude. These results suggest a greater effort for shame-
prone individuals than for guilt-prone individual in managing the memory of negative social emotions: guilt-
proneness seems to be a protective trait that can help in managing shame experiences. 
In both regression analysis trait anxiety didn’t seem to be a significant predictors of worse working memory 
performances. These data suggests that, although trait anxiety showed correlations with shame-proneness 
consistent with previous results (Tangney, Stuewig & Mashek, 2007), it doesn’t seem it predicts impairment in 
working memory performances after the elicitation of past emotional experiences. 
The memory of negative social emotion experiences can affect cognitive performances and working memory 
processes. In particular shame, both as emotional experience and as personal predisposition, seems to have 
greater negative consequences on working memory and to be therefore a more negative and disruptive emotion 
than guilt regarding attention and cognitive performances. Most of the times difficulties in understanding and 
remembering information in school and job contexts are managed through cognitive enhancement. As a result, 
only by supporting people in coping with social emotions and in particular with shame feelings, the working 
memory performances might be increased by the general ability to manage negative social emotions. 
There are several limitations to this study. The first was the use of a convenience sample of undergraduate 
female students: future studies should include a larger and, perhaps, a more generalized sample. Moreover, in 
performing guilt and shame writing task, people arbitrarily selected the negative experiences to write about and 
this could have led people talking about experiences with different nuance. Furthermore, data could have been 
influences by individual skill in get involved into personal memory about the past. Future replication of these 
findings with different samples will be needed to finally confirm an association between shame and working 
memory impairments. 
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